Capati v. Ocampo [GR L-28742, 30 April 1982]
Second Division, Escolin (p): 4 concur, 2 on leave.

Facts: Virgilio Capati, a resident of Bacolor, Pampanga was the contractor of the Feati Bank for the construction of its building in Iriga, Camarines Sur. On 23 May 1967, Capati entered into a sub-contract with the Dr. Jesus Ocampo, a resident of Naga City, whereby the latter, in consideration of the amount of P2,200.00, undertook to construct the vault walls, exterior walls and columns of the said Feati building in accordance with the specifications indicated therein. Ocampo further bound himself to complete said construction on or before 5 June 1967. Ocampo, however, was only able to finish the construction on 20 June 1967.

Due to the delay, Capati filed in the CFI Pampanga an action for recovery of consequential damages (Civil Case 3188) in the sum of P85,000.00 with interest, plus attorney’s fees and costs. Ocampo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue of action was improperly laid. The motion was premised on the stipulation printed at the back of the contract which provides that all actions arising out, or relating to this contract may be instituted in the CFI of the City of Naga. The lowe court dismissed the complaint. Hence the appeal.

The Supreme Court set aside the appealed order, and ordered the return of the records to the court of origin for further proceedings, with costs against defendant-appellee Ocampo.

1.    Where personal actions may be filed
The rule on venue of personal actions cognizable by the CFI is found in Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, which provides that such actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff. Said section is qualified by Section 3 of the same rule, providing that by written agreement of the parties the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one province to another.

2.    “May” only permissive
The word “may” is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term “may be” connotes possibility; it does not connote certainty. “May” is an auxillary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or possibility.  In the case at bar, the stipulation as to venue in the contract in question is simply permissive. By the said stipulation, the parties did not agree to file their suits solely and exclusively with the CFI Naga. They merely agreed to submit their disputes to the said court, without waiving their right to seek recourse in the court specifically indicated in Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court (See related case in Nicolas v. Reparations Commission: “May” is not mandatory). Since the complaint has been filed in the CFI Pampanga, where the plaintiff resides, the venue of action is properly laid in accordance with Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.

Sanciangco v. Rono [GR L-68709, 19 July 1985]
En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 10 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 1 took no part

Facts: Petitioner was elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Sta. Cruz, Ozamiz City, in the 17 May 1982 Barangay elections. Later, he was elected President of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by the Board of Directors of the said Association. As the President of the Association, petitioner was appointed by the President of the Philippines as a member of the City’s Sangguniang Panlungsod. On 27 March 1984, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the 14 May 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections for Misamis Occidental under the banner of the Mindanao Alliance. He was not successful in the said election. Invoking Section 13(2), Article 5 of BP 697, petitioner informed Vice-Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes, Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, that he was resuming his duties as member of that body. The matter was elevated to the Minister of Local Government Jose A. Roño, who ruled that since petitioner is an appointive official, he is deemed to have resigned from his appointive position upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and denied the writs prayed for, holding that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the officials; without costs.

1.    Petitioner holds public appointive position
The petitioner holds a public appointive position. He was appointed by the President as a member of the City’s Sangguniang Panlungsod by virtue of his having been elected President of the Association of Barangay Councils. This was pursuant to Section 3, paragraph 1 of BP 51 (An Act Providing for the elective or Appointive Positions in Various Local Governments and for Other Purposes), and reiterated by Section 183 of the Local Government Code (BP 337). Since petitioner is unquestionably an appointive member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City, he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to be such member when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 14 May 1984 Batasan elections.

2.    Statute to be construed in its entirety, and not taken as detached and isolated expressions; Legislative intent considered
It is a rule of statutory construction that when the language of a particular section of a statute admits of more than one construction, that construction which gives effect to the evident purpose and object sought to be attained by the enactment of the statute as a whole, must be followed. A statute’s clauses and phrases should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.  The legislative intent to cover public appointive officials in subsection (1), and officials mentioned in subsection (2) which should be construed to refer to local elective officials, can be gleaned from the proceedings of the Batasan Pambansa.

3.    No violation of equal protection clause or of due process of law
There was no violation of the equal protection clause since Section 13 of BP 697 applies alike to all persons subject to such legislation under like circumstances and conditions. Neither  was the petitioner removed from office without due process of law since it was of his own choice that he ran for a seat in the Batasan Pambansa. The consequence that followed his unsuccessful attempt at the elections arose from law. In the case at bar, the petitioner continues to be President of the Association of Barangay Councils. He will need a reappointment by the President to be a part of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Ozamis City,

People v. Manantan [GR L-14129, 31 July 1962]
En Banc, Regala (p):  7 concur, 1 took no part, 1 on leave

Facts: In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the CFI of that Province, Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the finding of a probable cause that the crime charged was committed by the defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upon defendant’s plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the peace, the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of the peace is within the purview of Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the CA in People vs. Macaraeg, (C.A.-G.R. No. 15613-R, 54 Off. Gaz., pp. 1873-76) where it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on this second motion to dismiss, the answer of the prosecution, the reply of the defense, and the opposition of the prosecution, the lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. Hence, the appeal by the Solicitor General.
The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order entered by the trial court and remanded the case for trial on the merits.

1.    Justice of peace is a judge; Judge defined
A justice of the peace is sometimes addressed as “judge” in this jurisdiction. It is because a justice of the peace is indeed a judge. A “judge” is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority. A judge is a public officer lawfully appointed to decide litigated questions according to law. In its most extensive sense the term includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justice of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts. The intention of the Legislature did not exclude the justice of the peace from its operation. In Section 54, there is no necessity to include the justice of peace in the enumeration, as previously made in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, as the legislature has availed itself of the more generic and broader term “judge,” including therein all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace (Still, it is to be noted that the first omission of the words “justice of the peace” was effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act 357; not the law being contrasted. In every case the word “judge” is used, it is not qualified by “of the first instance”. In every case the word “judge of the first instance”, it is followed by “justice of the peace”).

2.    History of the Philippine Election law
The first election law in the Philippines was Act 1582 (Philippine Commission, 1907), and which was later amended by Acts 1669, 1709*, 1726 and 1768. Act 1582, with its subsequent 4 amendments were later on incorporated in Chapter 18 of the Administrative Code. Under the Philippine Legislature, several amendments were made through the passage of Act 2310, 3336 and 3387*. During the time of the Commonwealth, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act  233 and later on enacted Commonwealth Act 357, which was the law enforced until 21 June  1947, when the Revised Election Code was approved. Included as its basic provisions are the provisions of Commonwealth Acts 233, 357, 605, 666, and 657. The present Code was further amended by RA 599, 867, 2242 and again, during the session of Congress in 1960, amended by RA 3036 and 3038.

3.    “Of any province” construed
The words “Of any province” cannot remove justices of the peace from the enumeration for the reason that they are municipal and not provincial officials, as a contrary view would likewise exclude justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals, who are national officials. The more sensible and logical interpretation of the said phrase is that it qualifies fiscals, treasurers and assessors who are generally known as provincial officers.

4.    Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est; application
Under the rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. The maxim “casus omisus” can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established.  The application of the rule of “casus omisus” does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. Substitution of terms is not omission.

5.    The rule of strict construction of penal statutes not only factor to interpret laws; Intent or spirit of law may be considered
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws. Instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. Cases will frequently be found enunciating the principle that the intent of the legislature will govern. It is to be noted that a strict construction should not be permitted to defeat the policy and purposes of the statute. The court may consider the spirit and reason of a statute, as in this particular instance, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers. The strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean such construction of it as to deprive it of the meaning intended. Penal statutes must be construed in the sense which best harmonizes with their intent and purpose. It must be noted that the purpose of the statute is to enlarge the officers within its purview; the contention that the justice of the peace from the enumeration is contrary to the purpose; as the partisan political activities of judges weaken rather than strengthen the judiciary.

6.    Executive department regard justice of peace within purview of Section 54
The administrative or executive department has regarded justices of the peace within the purview of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code (See Calo. v. Executive Secretary; the justice of peace of Carmen, Agusan was dismissed for engaging in electioneering).

7.    Intent of the legislature cannot be derived from a proposed bill
Until the bill becomes a law, it cannot be considered to contain or manifest any legislative intent. If the motives, opinions, and the reasons expressed by the individual members of the legislature, even in debates, cannot be properly taken into consideration in ascertaining the meaning of a statute, fortiori what weight can the Court give to mere draft of a bill.

8.    Expressio unius, est exclusio alterius not applicable in case
Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other persons or things not so enumerated should not have been included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so including them, the maxim expresio unius est exclusio alterius, should not be invoked.

Mutuc v. Comelec [GR L-32717, 26 November 1970]
First Division, Fernando (p):  7 concur, 2 on leave, 1 concur in separate opinion

Facts: Amelito Mutuc, a resident of Arayat, Pampanga filed his candidacy for the position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention. On 22 October 1970, he received a telegram from the Comelec, informing him that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but prohibiting him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sounds systems and loud speakers.  Five days after or on 25 October, he filed a special civil action for prohibition alleging Comelec violated his constitutional right to freedom of speech due to the prohibition. There being no plain, speedy and adequate remedy, according to petitioner, he sought a writ of prohibition, at the same time praying for a preliminary injunction.

On the very next day, the Supreme Court adopted a resolution requiring the Comelec to file an answer not later than 2 November 1970, at the same time setting the case for hearing for 3 November 1970. No preliminary injunction was issued. There was no denial in the answer filed by Comelec of the factual allegations set forth in the petition, but the justification for the prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, which made it unlawful for candidates “to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.” The Court, after deliberation and taking into account the need for urgency, the election being barely a week away, issued on the afternoon of the same day, a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition.

This decision was made to expound on the reasons behind the minute resolution. The Supreme Court permanently restrained and prohibited the Comelec from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its order banning the use of political taped jingle, pursuant to the SC resolution of 3 November 1970; without pronouncement as to costs.

1.    Ejusdem Generis
The principle of ejusdem generis provides the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. In the case at bar, The Constitutional Convention Act contemplated the prohibition on the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution (distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words “and the like.”).

2.    Construction should be in consonance to the Constitution
It is a cardinal principle of construction that a statute should be interpreted to assure its being in consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command or prescription.  The desirability of removing in that fashion the taint of constitutional infirmity from legislative enactments has always commended itself. The judiciary may even strain the ordinary meaning of words to avert any collision between what a statute provides and what the Constitution requires. The objective is to reach an interpretation rendering it free from constitutional defects. If at all possible, the conclusion reached must avoid not only that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score.

3.    Freedom of speech and free press is a preferred freedom
In unequivocal language, the Constitution prohibits an abridgment of free speech or a free press. It has been our constant holding that this preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. In the case at bar, the act of the Comelec in effect imposed censorship on petitioner, and evil against which the constitutional right is directed. Further, the constitutional guarantee is not to be emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his say, but not perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape or other mechanical contrivances.

4.    The Constitution is Supreme Law
The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, whether substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme law.

5.    Power of the Comelec limited to administrative questions
As the branch of the executive department — although independent of the President — to which the Constitution has given the exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections, the power of decision of the Comelec is limited to purely administrative questions. The Comelec cannot exercise any authority in conflict With or outside of the law, and there is no higher law than the Constitution.

People v. Estenzo [GR L-35376, 11 September 1980]
First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur

Facts: In a decision dated 28 September 1940 by the Cadastral Court, Lot 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre was declared public land.
On 23 February 1972, Aotes filed with the CFI Leyte (Branch V, Ormoc City) a petition to reopen the cadastral decision, under RA 931 as amended by RA 6236, claiming to be the owners and possessors of Lot 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre by virtue of hereditary succession but, due to their non-appearance on the date of the hearing of the Cadastral Case because of ignorance and excusable neglect, said land was declared public land and that they had been in adverse, peaceful and notorious possession of the said parcel of land since the time immemorial, paying all the taxes, interests and penalties. They pray that the decision of the Cadastral Court affecting Lot 4273, Ormoc Cadastre be reopened, and that they be allowed to file their cadastral answer. Opposition was made on 16 March 1972 claiming prescription. The judge denied the opposition for lack of sufficient merit on 9 May 1972, and rendered decision on 22 July 1972 after due hearing, declaring Lot 4273 public land and adjudicating said lot in favor of the Aoetes in undivided interest in equal share of ¼ each.

Dissatisfied with the decision of the lower court, petitioners filed the instant petition.

The Supreme Court set aside the 22 July 1972 decision of the respondent Judge and reiterating the 28 September 1940 decision of the Cadastral Court; without pronouncement as to costs.

1.    RA 931, RA 2061, and RA 6236
RA 931 (20 June 1953) granted a right within 5 years from 20 June 1953 to petition for a reopening of cadastral proceedings. RA 2061 (13 June 1958) fixed a new time limit which is up to 31 December 1968 to file applications for free patents, for the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles and for the reopening of judicial proceedings on certain lands which were declared public land. RA 6236 (19 June 1971) extended the time limit which is up to 31 December 1976 for the filing of applications for free patents and for the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. RA 6236 makes no reference to reopening of cadastral cases, unlike RA 2061.

2.    Express mention is implied exclusion
Under the legal maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius (Express Mention is Implied Exclusion), the express mention of one thing in a law, as a general rule, means the exclusion of others not expressly mentioned. This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind.  In the case at bar, if RA 6236 had intended that the extension it provided for applies also to reopening of cadastral cases, it would have so provided in the same way that it provided the extension of time to file applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title.

3.    When construction comes in
Where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. Likewise, it is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that where the terms of the statute are clear and unambiguous, no interpretation is called for, and the law is applied as written, for application is the first duty of courts, and interpretation, only were literal application is impossible or inadequate. The Court cannot alter the law, for such is a function that properly pertains to the legislative branch.

4.    Res judicata; Cadastral case is a judicial proceeding in rem
Generally, the fundamental principle of res judicata applies to all cases and proceedings, including land registration or cadastral proceedings.  The doctrine of res judicata precludes parties from relitigating issues actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment. It is well-settled that a prior judgment is conclusive in a subsequent suit between the same parties on the subject matter, and on the same cause of action, not only as to matters which were decided in the first action, but also as to every other matter which the parties could have properly set up in the prior suit.  Indeed, settled is the rule that a cadastral case is a judicial proceeding in rem, which, as such binds the whole world.  The final judgment rendered therein is deemed to have settled the status of the land subject thereof, if not noted thereon, like those of the petitioner, are deemed barred under the principle of res judicata.

People v. Santayana [GR L-22291, 15 November 1976]
Second Division, Concepcion Jr. (p): 4 concur, 1 took no part, 1 designated to sit in 2nd division

Facts: On 19 February 1962, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was appointed as “Special Agent” by then Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On 9 March 1962, a Memorandum Receipt for equipment was issued in the name of the accused regarding one pistol Melior SN-122137 with one (1) mag and stock. Col. Maristela likewise issued an undated certification to the effect that the accused was an accredited member of the CIS and the pistol described in the said Memorandum Receipt was given to him by virtue of his appointment as special agent and that he was authorized to carry and possess the same in the performance of his official duty and for his personal protection. On 29 October 1962, the accused was found in Plaza Miranda in possession of the pistol with four rounds of ammunition, cal. 25, without a license to possess them. An investigation was conducted and thereupon, a corresponding complaint was filed against the accused. The case underwent trial after which the accused was convicted of the crime charged with its corresponding penalty (indeterminate penalty of from 1 year and 1 day to 2 years and to pay the costs). Hence, the case was appealed to Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision, conformably with the recommendation of the Solicitor General, and acquitted Jesus Santayana, canceling the bond for his provisional release. Costs de oficio.

1. CFI has jurisdiction
The CFI had concurrent jurisdiction over crime involving illegal possession of firearms by virtue of Section 44 of RA 296, providing that CFI has original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than 6 months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos P200.00; and the offense charged in the information is punishable by imprisonment for a period of not less than 1 year and 1 day nor more than five 5 years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than one thousand pesos P1,000.00 or more than five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).

2. Macarandang case prevailing; Mapa case does not apply to case
The appointment of a civilian as “secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a peace officer equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879 (People v. Macarandang). In the case at bar, Santayana was appointed as CIS secret agent with the authority to carry and possess firearms. He was issued a firearm in the performance of his official duties and for his personal protection. Application of license was unnecessary, according to Col. Maristela, as the firearm is government property. No permit was issued, according to Capt. Adolfo Bringas as he was already appointed as a CIS agent.
Even if the case of People vs. Mapa revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang case, this was made only on 30 August 1967, years after the accused was charged. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of appellant’s appointment as secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for possession of the pistol in question.

Alfon v. Republic [GR L-51201, 29 May 1980]
Second Division, Abad Santos (p): 4 concur

Facts: Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on 15 May 1952 at the UST Hospital to Filomeno Duterte and Estrella. She was registered at the Local Civil Registrar’s Office as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte. On 15 June 1952, she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte at the St. Anthony de Padua Church, Singalong, Manila. Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte has been taken cared of by Mr. and Mrs. Hector Alfon. She lived in Mandaluyong for 23 years with her uncle, Hector Alfon. When Maria Estrella started schooling, she used the name Estrella S. Alfon. She attended her first grade up to fourth year high school at Stella Maris College using the name Estrella S. Alfon. After graduating from high school she enrolled at the Arellano University and finished Bachelor of Science in Nursing. Her scholastic records from elementary to college show that she was registered by the name of Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has exercised her right of suffrage under the same name. She has not committed any felony or misdemeanor.

She filed a verified petition on 28 April 1978 praying that her name be changed from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon. The CFI (Branch XXIII) partially denied petitioner’s prayer on 29 December 1978, granting the change of first name but not the surname.

The Supreme Court modified the appealed order in as much as that petitioner is allowed to change not only her first name but also her surname so as to be known as Estrella S. Alfon;  without costs.

1.    Principally is not equivalent to exclusively
The word “principally” as used in article 364 of the Civil Code is not equivalent to “exclusively” so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled. In the case at bar, the lower court erred in reasoning that as legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should principally use the surname of her father.

2.    Grounds for change of name
The following may be considered, among others, as proper or reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of name; (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change of status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion (1 Tolentino 660, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed; Haw Liong v. Republic). In the case at bar, to avoid confusion, the petition of name should be granted as the petitioner has been using the name of Estrella S. Alfon since childhood.

Matabuena v. Cervantes [GR L-28771, 31 March 1971]
En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: On 20 February 1956, Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of Petronila Cervantes during the time they were living as husband and wife in a common law relationship. They were later married on 28 March 1962. Felix died intestate on 13 September 1962. Cornelia Matabuena, being the sole sister and nearest and nearest relative to Felix, questioned the validity of the donation claiming that the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. She had the land declared on her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon on virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962. On 23 November 1965, the lower court upheld the validity of the donation as it was made before Cervantes’ marriage to the donor. Hence, the appeal.

The Supreme Court (1) reversed the 23 November 1965 decision of the lower court; (2) declared the questioned donation void and recognized the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property; and (3) remanded the case to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the current decision; without pronouncement as to costs.

1.    Prohibition of donation between spouses apply to common-law relationship
While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a “donation between the spouses during the marriage,” policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship, as it is contrary to public policy (JBL Reyes, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 1954). The law prohibits donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; ‘porque no se engañen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno [according to] the Partidas (Part IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale ‘Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur’ of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), ‘it would not be just that such donations should subsist, lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better.’ So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage.

2.    Spirit of the law
Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. “El espiritu que informa la ley debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicación de sus disposiciones.'’ It is a principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained.

3.    Lack of validity of donation does not result in exclusive right of plaintiff on property
The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage. She is therefore his widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half.

National Federation of Labor v. Eima [GR L-61236, 31 January 1984]
En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 concur with hope that Article 217 does not undergo repeated amendments, 1 took no part, 1 on leave

Facts: On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment, Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City, a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusive collective bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees of the Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. at its manufacturing plant in Lumbayao, Zamboanga City. Such employees, on 17 April 1982 charged the firm before the same office of the Ministry of Labor for underpayment of monthly living allowances.  On 3 May 1982, the union issued a notice of strike against the firm, alleging illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor practice; nonpayment of living allowances; and “employment of oppressive alien management personnel without proper permit. It was followed by the union submitting the minutes of the declaration of strike, including the 90 ballots (79, yes, 3 no). The strike began on 23 May 1982.

On 9 July 1982, Zambowood filed a complaint with the trial court against the officers and members of the union, for damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. 6 days later, there was a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of the restraining order and opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioners. The motion to dismiss was denied. Hence the petition for certiorari.

The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari, and nullified and set aside the 20 July 1982 order issued by the respondent Judge. It granted the writ of prohibition, and enjoined the Judge, or whoever acts in his behalf in the RTC to which this case is assigned, from taking any further action on Civil Case 716 (2751), except for the purpose of dismissing it. It also made permanent the TRO issued on 5 August 1982.

1.    Jurisdiction of case belong to labor arbiters and not CFI; History of amendments to Art. 217
(1) The original wording of Article 217 of the Labor Code vested the labor arbiters with jurisdiction (applied in Garcia v. Martinez  and in Bengzon v. Inciong). (2) On 1 May 1978, however, PD 1367 was issued, amending Article 217, and provided that the Regional Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for moral and other forms of damages. The ordinary courts were thus vested with jurisdiction to award actual and moral damages in the case of illegal dismissal of employees. (3) On 1 May 1980, PD 1691 was issued, further amending Article 217, returning the original jurisdiction to the labor arbiters, enabling them to decide all money claims of workers, including those based on nonpayment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits; all other claims arising from employer-employee relations unless expressly excluded by the Code.   (4) On 21 August 1981 BP 130, amending Article 217. Subparagraph 2, paragraph (a) was worded as “(2) those that involve wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment,” replacing the former phraseology: “(2) unresolved issue in collective bargaining, including those that involve wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment.”  BP 130 made no change with respect to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations.

Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit for damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a strike. The plain command of the law that it is a labor arbiter, not a court, that possesses original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide a claim for damages arising from picketing or a strike (Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Martinez; Ebon v. De Guzman; and Aguda v. Vallejos). Further, unless the law speaks clearly and unequivocally, trend shows that the choice should fall on an administrative agency (Philippine American Management & Financing Co., Inc. v. Management & Supervisors Association of the Philippine-American Management & Financing Co., Inc.).

2.    Statutory Construction, when applied
The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them (Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico, 1913). Any deviation from the express terms of the law cannot therefore be tolerated.

3.    Jurisdiction of exercise of compulsory arbitration and claims for damages under Article 217 belong to the Ministry of Labor
No valid distinction can be made between the exercise of compulsory arbitration vested in the Ministry of Labor and the jurisdiction of a labor arbiter to pass over claims for damages in the light of the express provision of the Labor Code as set forth in Article 217. In both cases, it is the Ministry, not a court of justice, that is vested by law with competence to act on the matter.

Caltex v. Palomar [GR L-19650, 29 September 1966]
En Banc, Castro (p): 9 concur

Facts: In 1960 Caltex conceived a promotional scheme denominated as “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest.” It calls for participants to estimate the actual number of liters  hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period. Participation is to be open indiscriminately to all “motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers”. For the privilege to participate, no fee or consideration is required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products required to be made. Entry forms are to be made available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can will be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.  A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned, the Dealer contest at the station level, the regional contest in 7 different regions, and the national level.  Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in view sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code. This was formalized by Caltex in a letter to the Postmaster General on 31 October 1960. The then Acting Postmaster General, however, declined the grant the requested clearance. On 7 December 1960, Caltex sought a reconsideration. Relying, however, on an opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justice on an unrelated case 7 years before (Opinion 217, s. 1953), the Postmaster General maintained that the contest involves consideration, or that, if not, it is nevertheless a “gift enterprise” which is equally banned by the Ponstal Law, and in his letter of 10 December 1960 not only denied the use of the mails for purposes of the proposed contest but as well threatened that if the contest was conducted, “a fraud order will have to be issued against Caltex and all its representatives.
Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing a petition for declaratory relief against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, praying that judgment be rendered declaring its Caltex Hooded Pump Contest not to be violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public. The trial court ruled that the contest does not violate the Postal Code and that Palomar has no right to bar the public distribution of the contest rules by the mails. Palomar appealed.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment, without costs.

1.    Declaratory relief, when utilized
By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court, declaratory relief is available to any person whose rights are affected by a statute to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder (now section 1, Rule 64, Revised Rules of Court).

2.    Conditions sine qua non for declaratory relief
Conditions sine qua non: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination. In the case at bar, all the conditions are present. Caltex’s insistent assertion of its claim to the use of the mails for its proposed contest, and the challenge thereto and consequent denial by Palomar of the privilege demanded, undoubtedly spawned a live controversy. There is an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other, concerning a real question or issue. The contenders are as real as their interest are substantial. To Caltex, the uncertainty occasioned by the divergence of views on the issue of construction hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance its business. To Palomar, the suppression of Caltex’s proposed contest believed to transgress a law he has sworn to uphold and enforce is an unavoidable duty. With Caltex’s bent to hold the contest and the Palomar’s threat to issue a fraud order therefor if carried out, the contenders are confronted by the ominous shadow of an imminent and inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled and stabilized by a tranquilizing declaration.

3.    Definition of Statutory Construction
Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law (Black). In the case at bar, whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein.

4,    Judicial duty to look into substance of law
The Court is tasked to look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element and pernicious tendencies which the law is seeking to prevent.

5.    Case not an advisory opinion nor premature; Rules of Court liberally construed
Even if there has been no breach of the Postal Law yet, there is propriety or necessity of setting the dispute at rest before it accumulates the asperity, distemper, animosity, passion and violence of a full-blown battle which looms ahead. Denial of declaratory relief would force it to choose between undesirable alternatives: that of being a self-appointed censor, or that to be at risk of a fraud order. Considering the alternatives in one equation and in the spirit of liberality with which the Rules of Court are to be interpreted in order to promote their object (Section 1, Rule 1, Revised Rules of Court), i.e. to settle, and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to, rights and duties under a law; there is no imposition upon the Court’s jurisdiction or any futility or prematurity in our intervention.

6.    Judicial decision interpreting or applying a law forms part of legal system
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form a part of the legal system”(Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). In effect, judicial decision assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto. The jurisdiction of the Court, nor its ruling’s force and binding effect, cannot be underrated not to have the final and pacifying function that a declaratory judgment is calculated to subserve. At the very least, the appellant will be bound. Precedent are abundant to support the conclusion that the Court has reached (Liberty Calendar Co. v. Cohen, 19 NJ 399, 117 A 2d 487; In pari material, also: Bunis v. Conway, 17 App. Div. 2d, 207, 234 NYS 2d, 435; Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, supra.; Thrillo, Inc. v. Scott, 15 NJ Super. 124, 82 A. 2d, 903)

7.    Lottery and gift enterprise defined; Caltex contest not a lottery nor gift enterprise
The term ‘lottery’ extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance (El Debate v. Topacio, 44 Phil 278, 1922; citing various jurisprudence). With respect to the last element of consideration, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but does condemn as criminal schemes in which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.
While an all-embracing concept of the term “gift enterprise” is yet to be spelled out in explicit words, there appears to be a consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities that the term is commonly applied to a sporting artifice under which goods are sold for their market value but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize.
In the case at bar, there is no requirement in the rules that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate; for the scheme to be deemed a lottery. Neither is there is a sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser for the scheme to be deemed a gift enterprise. The scheme is merely a gratuitous distribution of property by chance.

8.    Consideration does not consist of benefit derived by sponsor of the contest
The required element of consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by the proponent of the contest.  The true test is whether the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance, and not whether those conducting the enterprise receive something of value in return for the distribution of the prize. Perspective properly oriented, the standpoint of the contestant is all that matters, not that of the sponsor (People vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d. 99, 137 Cal. App. (Supp). 788)

9.    Conflicting viewpoints on gift enterprise warrants resolution on case-to-case basis
The apparent conflict of opinions (for one: holding that a gift enterprise involving an award by chance, even in default of the element of consideration necessary to constitute a lottery, is prohibited; or the other: like a lottery, a gift enterprise comes within the prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite elements of prize, chance and consideration)  is explained by the fact that the specific statutory provisions relied upon are not identical. In some cases, the terms “lottery” and “gift enterprise” are used interchangeably; in others, the necessity for the element of consideration or chance has been specifically eliminated by statute. Every case, thus, must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the applicable statutory provision.

10.    Noscitur a sociis
Consonant to the well-known principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis, the term under construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term “gift enterprise” be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the “gift enterprise” therein included. This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by the law, resort to the determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory construction. Mail fraud orders, it is axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of the mails as a medium for disseminating printed matters which on grounds of public policy are declared non-mailable. As applied to lotteries, gift enterprises and similar schemes, justification lies in the recognized necessity to suppress their tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals. Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute ‘lottery’, if it is not resorted to as a device to evade the law and no consideration is derived, directly or indirectly, from the party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated or stimulated thereby. Thus, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration.