Ocampo vs. Ombudsman [G.R. No. 114683.  January 18, 2000.]
Second Division, Buena (J): 4 concurring

Facts: On 21 March 1988, K.N. Paudel of the Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal (ADBN) wrote a letter to Niaconsult  Inc., a subsidiary of the National Irrigation Administration, requesting a training proposal on small-scale community irrigation development. On 17 November 1988, Jesus C. Ocampo as the training coordinator of the Niaconsult, sent a letter-proposal requested by ADBN. Another letter was sent by Ocampo on 31 January 1989 to Dr. Peiter Roeloffs of ADBN confirming the availability of Niaconsult to conduct the training program and formally requesting advance payment of 30% percent of the training fees in the amount of US $9,600.00 or P204,960.00. Niaconsult conducted the training program for 6 Nepalese Junior Engineers from 6 February to 7 March 1989. ADBN, thru its representative, Deutsche Gesselschaft Technische Zusummenarbeit (GTZ) Gmbh Technical Cooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany paid to Ocampo the agreed training fee in two installments of P61,488.00 and P143,472.00. On 1 April 1991, Niaconsult, through its president, Wilfredo S. Tiongco, wrote a letter to Ocampo demanding the turn-over of the total training fee paid by ADBN which Ocampo personally received. Despite receipt of the letter, Ocampo failed to remit the said amount prompting Niaconsult through its president, Maximino Eclipse, to file an administrative case before the Ombudsman for serious misconduct and/or fraud or willful breach of trust.

Finding enough basis to proceed with the administrative case, the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Ombudsman, on 17 February 1992, issued an order requiring Ocampo to file his counter-affidavit within 10 days from receipt with a caveat that failure to file the same would be deemed a waiver of his right to present evidence. Despite notice, Ocampo failed to comply with the said order. A year later, or on 17 March 1993, the Ombudsman issued another order giving Ocampo another chance to file his counter-affidavit and controverting evidence. Again, Ocampo failed. Thus, on 14 April  1993, Eclipse was required to appear before the Ombudsman to present evidence to support its complaint. On 18 November 1993, the Ombudsman (OMB-Adm-O-92-0020) issued the a Resolution recommending that Ocampo discharged from the service, with forfeiture of benefits and special perpetual disqualification to hold office in the government or any government-owned or controlled corporation; without prejudice to any civil action Niaconsult may institute to recover the amount so retained by Niaconsult. On 16 February 1994, Ocampo moved for reconsideration and to re-open the case claiming that he was denied due process. On 28 February 1994, the Ombudsman denied the motion. Hence, the petition for certiorari.

While the case is pending, Ocampo filed a Manifestation on 24 May 1997 stating that the criminal complaint for estafa and falsification filed against him based on the same facts or incidents which gave rise to the administrative case, was dismissed by the RTC on 24 February 997. With the dismissal of the criminal case, Ocampo manifests that the administrative case can no longer stand on its own and therefore should be dismissed.

The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit and affirmed the assailed Resolutions of Ombudsman.

1.    Dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action; Quantum of evidence required in criminal, civil and administrative cases
The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed against Ocampoo or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. The RTC, in dismissing the criminal complaint, was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of Ocampo beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction. The lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, though insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of evidence. Then too, there is the “substantial evidence” rule in administrative proceedings which merely requires such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other.

2.    Essence of due process; Oral and written arguments; Judicial and Administrative due process
The essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even many times more creditably and practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings, moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense.

3.    Ocampo amply accorded opportunity to be heard
Ocampo has been amply accorded the opportunity to be heard. He was required to answer the complaint against him. In fact, Ocampo was given considerable length of time to submit his counter-affidavit. It took more than one year from 17 February 1992 before Ocampo was considered to have waived his right to file his counter-affidavit and the formal presentation of the complainant’s evidence was set. The 17 March 1993 order was issued to give Ocampo a last chance to present his defense, despite the private Niaconsult’s objections. But Ocampo failed to comply with the second order.

4.    He who chooses not to avail opportunity to answer charges cannot complain of denial of due process
Ocampo’s failure to present evidence is solely of his own making and cannot escape his own remissness by passing the blame on the graft investigator. While the Ombudsman has shown forbearance, Ocampo has not displayed corresponding vigilance. He therefore cannot validly claim that his right to due process was violated. A party who chooses not to avail of the opportunity to answer the charges cannot complain of a denial of due process.

Petitioner’s claim that he was not given any notice of the order declaring him to have waived his right to file his counter-affidavit and of allowing the private respondent to present evidence ex-parte is unmeritorious.

5.    Waiver; Ombudsman need not issue another order notifying accused that he has waived right
The orders of the Ombudsman requiring Ocampo to submit his counter-affidavit and which was admittedly received by the latter explicitly contain a warning that if no counter-affidavit was filed within the given period, a waiver would be considered and the administrative proceedings shall continue according to the rules. Thus, the Ombudsman need not issue another order notifying Ocampo that he has waived his right to file a counter-affidavit. In the same way, Ocampo need not be notified of the ex-parte hearing for the reception of NIAConsult’s evidence. As such, he could not have been expected to appear at the ex-parte hearing.

6.    Ocampo indeed dishonest and untrustworthy based on records of case
The record of the case indisputably shows that Ocampo is guilty of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the government when he failed to remit the payment of the training program conducted by Niaconsult. The evidence presented sufficiently established that Ocampo received the payments of ADBN through its representative, GTZ, Philippines the amount of US $9,600.00 and that he failed to account this and remit the same to the corporation. All these acts constitute dishonesty and untrustworthiness.

Guevara vs. Comelec [G.R. No. L-12596.  July 31, 1958.]
En Banc, Bautista-Angelo (J): 7 concurring

Facts: The Comelec, on 4 May 1957, after proper negotiations, awarded to the National Shipyards & Steel Corporation (NASSCO), the Acme Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. (ACME), and the Asiatic Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. (ASIATIC), the contracts to manufacture and supply the Commission 12,000, 11,000 and 11,000 ballot boxes at P17.64, P14.00 and P17.00 each, respectively. On 8 May 1957, both the NASSCO and the ASIATIC signed with the Comelec the corresponding contracts thereon. On 13 May 1957, the Comelec cancelled the award to the ACME for failure of the latter to sign the contract within the designated time and awarded to the NASSCO and the ASIATIC, one-half each, the 11,000 ballot boxes originally alloted to the ACME. The corresponding contracts thereon were signed on 16 May 1957. A series of petitions were filed by ACME for the reconsideration of the resolution of the Commission of 13 May 1957. The first was filed on 14 May 1957 which, after hearing, was denied by the Comelec in its resolution of 16 May 1957. The second was filed on 16 May 1957 and was denied on 17 May 1957. The third was filed on 20 May 1957, and because of the seriousness of the grounds alleged therein for the annulment of its previous resolutions, the Comelec resolved to conduct a formal investigation on the matter ordering the NASSCO and the ASIATIC to file their respective answers. Thereafter, after these corporations had filed their answers, the Comelec held a formal hearing thereon on 24 May 1957. On 28 May 1957, the ACME filed a memorandum on the points adduced during the hearing, and on 4 June 1957, the Commission issued its resolution denying the third motion for reconsideration. The article signed by Jose Guevara was published in the 2 June 1957 issue of the Sunday Times, a newspaper of nationwide circulation.

Guevara was ordered by the Comelec to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for having published in the Sunday Times issue of 2 June 1957 an article entitled “Ballot Boxes Contract Hit”, which tended to interfere with and influence the Comelec and its members in the adjudication of a controversy then pending investigation and determination before said body “arising from the third petition for reconsideration of 20 May 1957 and the supplementary petition thereof of 1 June 1957 filed by ACME; and which article likewise tended to degrade, bring into disrepute, and undermine the exclusive constitutional function of the Comelec and its Chairman Domingo Imperial and Member Sixto Brillantes in the administration of all the laws relative to the conduct of elections. Guevar, answering the summons issued to him by the Comelec, appeared and filed a motion to quash. The Comelec, after hearing, denied the motion to quash but granted Guevara a period of 15 days within which to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court in view of the issue raised which assails the jurisdiction of the Commission to investigate and punish Guevara for contempt in connection with the alleged publication. Hence the petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, and enjoined the Comelec from proceeding with the contempt case set forth in its resolution of 20 June 1957, without pronouncement as to costs. The preliminary injunction issued by the Supreme Court was made permanent.

1.    Commission on Elections; Nature
The Commission on Elections is an independent administrative body which was established by our Constitution to take charge of the enforcement of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and devise means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of free, orderly, and honest elections (Sumulong vs. Commission on Elections, 73 Phil., 288; Nacionalista Party vs. The Solicitor General, 85 Phil., 101; 47 Off. Gaz. 2356).

2.    Commission on Elections; Powers defined in the Constitution
The Comelec’s powers are defined in the Constitution. It provides that it “shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions, affecting elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election officials” (Section 2, Article X).

3.    Commission on Elections; Supplemental powers embodied in Section 5 of the Revised Election Code
The Revised Election Code supplements what other powers may be exercised by said Commission. Among these powers are those embodied in Section 5 of said Code. It provides, “the Commission on Elections or any of the members thereof shall have the power to summon the parties to a controversy pending before it, issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and otherwise take testimony in any investigation or hearing pending before it, and delegate such power to any officer. Any controversy submitted to the Commission on Elections shall be tried, heard and decided by it within fifteen days counted from the time the corresponding petition giving rise to said controversy is filed. The Commission or any of the members thereof shall have the power to punish contempts provided for in rule sixty-four of the Rules of Court, under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein. Any violation of any final and executory decision, order or ruling of the Commission shall constitute contempt of the Commission. Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission on Elections may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari in accordance with the Rules of Court or with such rules as may be promulgated by the Supreme Court.”

4.    Comelec’s power to enforce election laws and power to try hear and decide election controversies
The Comelec not only has the duty to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections but the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with the elections. And as an incident of this power, it may also punish for contempt in those cases provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein.

5.    Quasi-judicial functions of the Comelec; Difficulty in determining demarcation between administrative duty and justiciable function
The Comelec, although it cannot be classified as a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 13, Article VIII), for it is merely an independent administrative body (The Nacionalista Party vs. Vera, 85 Phil., 126; 47 Off. Gaz. 2375), may however exercise quasi-judicial functions in so far as controversies that by express provision of the law come under its jurisdiction. As to what questions may come within this category, neither the Constitution nor the Revised Election Code specifies. The former merely provides that it shall come under its jurisdiction, saving those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions affecting elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and other election officials, while the latter is silent as to what questions may be brought before it for determination. But it is clear that, to come under its jurisdiction, the questions should be controversial in nature and must refer to the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of election. The difficulty lies in drawing the demarcation line between a duty which inherently is administrative in character and a function which is justiciable and which would therefore call for judicial action by the Commission. But this much depends upon the factors that may intervene when a controversy should arise.

6.    Jurisprudence: where Comelec has no power
The Comelec has no power to annul an election which might not have been free, orderly and honest for such matter devolves upon other agencies of the Government (Nacionalista Party vs. Commission on Elections, 85 Phil., 148; 47 Off. Gaz. 2851); neither does it have the power to decide the validity or invalidity of votes cast in an election for such devolves upon the courts or the electoral tribunals (Ibid.); it does not also have the power to order a recounting of the votes before the proclamation of election even if there are discrepancies in the election returns for it is a function of our courts of justice (Ramos vs. Commission on Elections, 80 Phil., 722); nor does it have the power to order the correction of a certificate of canvass after a candidate had been proclaimed and assumed office (De Leon vs. Imperial, 94 Phil., 680); and only very recently it was held that the Commission has no power to reject a certificate of candidacy except only when its purpose is to create confusion in the minds of the electors (Abcede vs. Imperial, 103 Phil., 136).

7.    Jurisprudence: where Comelec has power
It has been held that the Commission has the power to annul an illegal registry list of voters (Feliciano, et al. vs. Lugay, et al., 93 Phil., 744; 49 Off. Gaz. 3863); to annul an election canvass made by a municipal board of canvassers (Mintu vs. Enage, et al., G. R. No. L-1834); and to investigate and act on the illegality of a canvass of election made by a municipal board of canvassers (Ramos vs. Commission on Elections, 80 Phil., 722).

8.    Ministerial duties of the Comelec in connection with the conduct of elections
In the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections, the first duty of the Commission is to set in motion all the multifarious preparatory processes ranging from the purchase of election supplies, printing of election forms and ballots, appointments of members of the boards of inspectors, establishment of precincts and designation of polling places to the preparation of the registry lists of voters, so as to put in readiness on election day the election machinery in order that the people who are legally qualified to exercise the right of suffrage may be able to cast their votes to express their sovereign will. It is incumbent upon the Commission to see that all these preparatory acts will insure free, orderly and honest elections. All provisions of the Revised Election Code contain regulations relative to these processes preparatory for election day. It is incumbent upon the Commission on Elections to see that all these preparatory acts are carried out freely, honestly and in an orderly manner. It is essential that the Commission or its authorized representatives, in establishing precincts or designating polling places, must act freely, honestly and in an orderly manner. It is also essential that the printing of election forms and the purchase of election supplies and their distribution are done freely, honestly and in an orderly manner. It is further essential that the political parties or their duly authorized representatives who are entitled to be represented in the boards of inspectors must have the freedom to choose the person who will represent them in each precinct throughout the country. It is further essential that once organized, the boards of inspectors shall be given all the opportunity to be able to perform their duties in accordance with law freely, honestly and in an orderly manner, individually and as a whole. In other words, it is the duty of the Commission to see that the boards of inspectors, in all their sessions, are placed in an atmosphere whereby they can fulfill their duties without any pressure, influence and interference from any private person or public official. All these preparatory steps are administrative in nature and all questions arising therefrom are within the exclusive powers of the Commission to resolve. All irregularities, anomalies and misconduct committed by any election official in these preparatory steps are within the exclusive power of the Commission to correct. Any erring official must respond to the Commission for investigation. (Decision of the Commission on Elections, October 28, 1951, In Re Petition of Angel Genuino vs. Prudente, et al., Case No. 196) The preparation of the permanent list of votes is completely an administrative matter.

9.    Requisitioning and preparation of ballot boxes to be used in election a ministerial duty
Considering that the paramount administrative duty of the Commission is to set in motion all the multifarious preparatory processes ranging from the purchase of election supplies, printing of election forms and ballots, appointments of members of the board of inspectors, establishment of precincts and designation of polling places to the preparation of registry lists of voters, so as to put in readiness on election day the election machinery, it may also be reasonably said that the requisitioning and preparation of the necessary ballot boxes to be used in the elections is by the same token an imperative ministerial duty which the Commission is bound to perform if the elections are to be held.

10.    Comelec has no power to punish for contempt if the Commission is merely discharging ministerial duty
The controversy merely refers to a ministerial duty which the Commission has performed in its administrative capacity in relation to the conduct of elections ordained by the Constitution. In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature.

11.    Power to punish for contempt inherent in courts
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the administration of justice” (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271; U. S. vs. Loo Hoe, 36 Phil., 867; In Re Sotto, 46 Off. Gaz. 2570; In Re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944). The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of courts (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, Ibid.). Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony (People vs. Swena, 296 P., 271). And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid (Langenberg vs. Decker, 31 N.E. 190; In Re Sims 37 P., 135; Roberts vs. Hacney, 58 S.W., 810).

Gonzales vs. LBP [GR 76759.  March 22, 1990.]
Third Division, Fernando (J) : 4 concurring

Facts: On the strength of a Deed of Assignment executed on 8 August 1981 by Ramos Plantation Company Inc. through its president, Antonio Vic Zulueta, assigning its rights under Land Transfer Claim 82-757 unto Ramon A. Gonzales. Gonzales filed an action before the RTC Manila, Branch 51 (Civil Case 84-24461) to compel Land Bank of the Philippines to issue Land Bank Bonds for the amount of P400,000.00 in Gonzales’ name of instead of in the name of the corporation as the original and registered owner of the property covered by TCT T-28755 situated in La Suerte, Malang, North Cotabato with a total area of 251.4300 hectares, which had been brought under the land transfer program of the government. Corporation was declared in default for failure to file its answer within the reglementary period while the LBP filed an answer alleging that the complaint states no cause of action since there is no privity of contract between Gonzales and itself and that it deals only with the landowner whose land was subjected to operation land transfer of the government under PD 27 in order to save time and effort in ascertaining the identities of additional claimants. On 15 October 1985, the lower court found Gonzales entitled to the issuance of the Land Bank bonds and thus ordered the LBP to issue to his name P400,000 P400,000.00 worth of land bank bonds deducted from the P509,000 LBP bonds payable to the corporation under claim 82-757 with the directive to the landowner –corporation to comply with the 6 requirements listed in paragraph 1 of the Supplemental Stipulation of Facts dated 10 September 1985 (parties submitted the first Stipulation of Facts 29 July 1985).

LBP filed an appeal before Court of Appeals resulting in the reversal of the trial court’s decision on 2 December 1986 and the dismissal of the complaint filed therein on the ground that even if there was compliance with the remaining 6 requirements by the corporation still, the Land Bank bonds will have to be issued in the name of the said corporation and not to Gonzales. It is only thereafter that the corporation may indorse the same to Gonzales. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.

The Supreme Court modified the decision of the appellate court, by reinstating the directive to Ramos Plantation Company, Inc. contained in the lower court’s decision; and ordered the corporation to comply within 30 days from notice with the 6 requirements listed in paragraph 1 of the Supplemental Stipulation of Facts dated 10 September 1985, and as soon as the bonds are released in its name, to immediately endorse the same to Gonzales as assignee thereof.

1.    Jurisdiction: Existence of stipulation of facts does not mean parties agreed on all facts; Remedy of appeal to the Court of Appeals proper
The existence of a stipulation of facts between the parties does not automatically mean that the parties agreed on all the facts considering that stipulations may be total or partial. In the present case instance, it was merely partial.  A perusal of the Stipulation and Supplemental Stipulation of Facts dated 29 July 1985 and 10 September 1985, respectively, readily reveals that the same do not contain a complete or sufficient picture of the circumstances among the parties and that certain vital matters are left out in said stipulations, i.e., the significant policy of the LBP to issue its bonds directly and only in the name of the landowners; and the fact that there are different stages in the release of payments under the operation land transfer program with each stage having different requirements that have to be complied with by the landowner in order to be entitled to payment under a land transfer claim. In view of these omissions in the Stipulations, the remedy of appeal before the appellate court resorted to by the bank is proper because it involved not only pure questions of law but mixed questions of law and fact.

2.    Resolution 75-68 governs issuance of Land Bank Bonds to assignees; LBP issues bonds in name of assignor-landowner
The bank, in denying the issuance of the bond in the name of the assignee, was guided by Resolution 75-68 entitled “Proper Parties to Receive Land Transfer Payment” promulgated purposely to govern, among others, the issuance of Land Bank Bonds to assignees by virtue of Deeds of Assignment. Thereunder the LBP can only issue bonds in the name of the assignor-landowner. It is only after the issuance of bonds in the landowner’s name that he shall be required to make the necessary indorsement of the bonds to his assignee. This is in consonance with the Land Bank’s policy to deal primarily with the landowners in order to save time and effort in ascertaining the identities of claimants.

3.    Assignment of Land Transfer Claim subject to the rules and restrictions imposed by LBP
Gonzales relied on the provisions of Article 1311 of the Civil Code, i.e. that by virtue of said deed, he stepped into the shoes of his assignor and acquired all the rights of the latter. Gonzales indeed stepped into the shoes of his assignor, but he overlooked the fact that when the corporation assigned its rights to him under Land Transfer Claim 82-757, the same was subject to the rules and restrictions imposed by LBP on the matter of assignment of rights.

4.    Rules and regulation on the issuance of Bonds, based on Section 76 of RA 3844, as amended by PD 251
In the promulgation of said rules and regulations, the LBP relied on the provisions of Section 76, RA 3844 as amended by PD 251, which specifically provides that “the Board of Directors shall have the power to prescribe rules and regulations for the issuance, reissuance, servicing, placement and redemption of the bonds herein authorized to be issued as well as the registration of such bonds at the request of the holders thereof.”

5.    Assignment does not erase liens or restrictions burdening the right assigned
The act of assignment could not operate to erase liens or restrictions burdening the right assigned. The assignee cannot, after all, acquire a greater right than that pertaining to the assignor.  In the present case, when the corporation assigned its rights, title and interest in Land Transfer Claim 82-757 for the amount of P400,000.00 in favor of Gonzales, the latter acquired the same subject to the restrictions on assignment of rights embodied in Resolution 75-68 dated 25 February 1975 passed by the Board of respondent LBP.

6.    Pertinent provision of Resolution 85-68
“In Assignment of Rights entered into by landowners vesting upon the Assignee the right to receive full or partial payment from the Land Bank pursuant to land transfer, the same, if found valid in form and substance, shall be recognized by the Land Bank. Whenever practicable, Land Bank bonds issued therefor must be made payable to the Assignor-Landowner who shall be required to make the necessary indorsement of said bonds to the Assignee. In case the cash portion is the one assigned, the check in payment thereof shall be issued to the original landowner who shall be required to make the indorsement to the Assignee. Thus, for record purposes, it will appear that payment was directly to the landowner concerned and who, by reason of the Assignment, has caused the necessary indorsement of the bonds and/or check, as the case may be, to the Assignee.”

7.    Administrative regulations and policies have force of law and entitled to great respect; their legality is presumed
It is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and entitled to great respect. They have in their favor a presumption of legality.

8.    Corporation to comply with requirements imposed by LBP
The corporation should comply with all the requirements imposed by LBP to effect the release of payments under land transfer claims, because of the restriction that the bonds will only be released in the name of the landowner-assignor corporation which may thereafter indorse the same to the assignee.

9.    Decision of trial court, in fact, is final and executory
In fact, in the decision of the trial court, the corporation was directed to comply with the 6 requirements listed in paragraph 1 of the Supplemental Stipulation of Facts dated 10 September 1985. Since no appeal was taken by the corporation from said decision, said directive has become final and executory.

10.    The necessity to modify the decision of the appellate court
The decision of the appellate court, however, dismissing Gonzales’ complaint had the effect of reversing said directive, thereby leaving Gonzales without legal authority to compel the corporation to comply with the requirements of the LBP for the release of the bonds and thereafter to endorse the same to Gonzales as assignee thereof. The decision of the appellate court should therefore be modified accordingly.

Cruz vs. Youngberg [GR 34674. 26 October 1931.]
En Banc, Ostrand (J): 8 concur

Facts: Mauricio Cruz brought a petition for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction before the CFI Manila against the Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, Stanton Youngberg, requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of 10 large cattle imported by him from Australia and for the slaughter thereof. Cruz attacked the constitutionality of Act 3155, which prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. The Director demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was based on two reasons, namely, (1) that if Act 3155 were declared unconstitutional and void, Cruz would not be entitled to the relief demanded because Act 3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit the Director from giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid.
The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of the failure of Cruz to file another complaint. From that order of dismissal, Cruz appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision appealed from; with the costs against Cruz.

1.    Nullity of Act 3052 would make it impossible for Director to grant permit for the importation of cattle
If Act 3155 is declared unconstitutional, still Cruz can not be allowed to import cattle from Australia for the reason that, while Act 3155 were declared unconstitutional, Act 3052 would automatically become effective. Cruz does not present any allegation in regard to Act 3052 to show its nullity or unconstitutionality though it appears clearly that in the absence of Act 3155 the former act would make it impossible for the Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry to grant Cruz a permit for the importation of the cattle without the approval of the head of the corresponding department.

2.    Unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal former laws
An unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal former laws or parts of laws by implication, since, being void, it is not inconsistent with such former laws.

3.    Court does not pass upon constitutionality of statutes unless it is necessary
The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes unless it is necessary to do so (McGirr vs. Aldanese and Trinidad, 43 Phil., 259). In the present case, it is not necessary to pass upon the validity of the statute because even if it were declared unconstitutional, the petitioner would not be entitled to relief inasmuch as Act 3052 is not in issue.

4.    Provisions of Acts 3052 and 3155 entirely; Promotion of industries affecting the public welfare are objects within scope of police power; Court not to determine if measure is wise or best
Aside from the provisions of Act 3052, Act 3155 is entirely valid. The Legislature passed Act 3155 to protect the cattle industry of the country and to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases through the importation of foreign cattle. The promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police power. Act 3155 was promulgated as there was reasonable necessity therefore when it was enacted and it cannot be said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act. That being so, it is not for this court to avoid or vacate the Act upon constitutional grounds nor will it assume to determine whether the measures are wise or the best that might have been adopted.

5.    Distinction between delegation of power to make law and conferring an authority or discretion as to execution
The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made (Wilmington and Zanesville Railroad Co. vs. Commissioners of Clinton County). In the present case, there is no unlawful delegation of legislative power.

6.    Act 3155 is a complete statute; does not amend but merely supplemental to the Tariff Law
Act 3155 is a complete statute in itself. It does not make any reference to the Tariff Law. It does not permit the importation of articles, whose importation is prohibited by the Tariff Law. It is not a tariff measure but a quarantine measure, a statute adopted under the police power of the Philippine Government. It is at most a ’supplement’ or an ‘addition’ to the Tariff Law. (See MacLeary vs. Babcock, 82 N. E., 453, 455; 169 Ind., 228 for distinction between ’supplemental’ and ‘amendatory’ and O’Pry vs. U. S., 249 U. S., 323; 63 Law. ed., 626, for distinction between ‘addition’ and ‘amendment.’)”

CSC vs. Lucas [G.R. No. 127838.  January 21, 1999.]
En Banc, Pardo (J): 14 concur

Facts: On 26 May 1992, Raquel P. Linatok, an assistant information officer at the Agricultural Information Division, Department of Agriculture, filed with the office of the Secretary, DA, an affidavit-complaint against Jose J. Lucas, a photographer of the same agency, for misconduct (allegedly touching the former’s thigh, and throwing her out of the office after she kicked him for touching her). On 8 June 1992, the Board of Personnel Inquiry, DA, issued a summons requiring Lucas to answer the complaint, not to file a motion to dismiss, within 5 days from receipt. On 17 June 1992, Lucas submitted a letter to Jose P. Nitullano, assistant head, BOPI, denying the charges. According to Lucas, he did not touch the Linatok’s thigh, that what transpired was that he accidentally brushed Linatok’s leg when he reached for his shoes and that the same was merely accidental and he did not intend nor was there malice when his hand got in contact with Linatok’s leg. On 31 May  1993, after a formal investigation by the BOPI, DA, the board issued a resolution finding Lucas guilty of simple misconduct and recommending a penalty of suspension for 1 month and 1 day. The Secretary of Agriculture approved the recommendation.

Lucas appealed the decision to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). On 7 July 1994, the CSC issued a resolution finding Lucas guilty of grave misconduct and imposing on him the penalty of dismissal from the service. Lucas moved for reconsideration but the CSC denied the motion. Lucas appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR SP 37137). On 29 October 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision setting aside the resolution of the CSC and reinstating the resolution of the BOPI, DA. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court denied the petition for review on certiorari and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

1.    Existing CSC guideline distinguishing simple and grave misconduct
There is an existing guideline of the CSC distinguishing simple and grave misconduct. Memorandum circular No. 49-89 dated 3 August 1989 (also known as the guidelines in the application of penalties in administrative cases) itself which classifies administrative offenses into three: grave, less grave and light offenses. The charge of grave misconduct falls under the classification of grave offenses while simple misconduct is classified as a less grave offense. The former is punishable by dismissal while the latter is punishable either by suspension (1 month and 1 day to 6 months), if it is the first offense; or by dismissal, if it is the second. Thus, they should be treated as separate and distinct offenses.

2.    Elements of corruption, clear intent to violate law or flagrant disregard of establish rule not found in present case
As held in the case of Landrito vs. Civil Service Commission, in grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest.” These are obviously lacking in the present case

3.    Due process
A basic requirement of due process is that a person must be duly informed of the charges against him and that a person can not be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged.  In the present case, Lucas came to know of the modification of the charge against him only when he received notice of the resolution dismissing him from the service.

4.    Administrative proceedings not exempt from fundamental procedural principles
Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings. The right to substantive and procedural due process is applicable in administrative proceedings. Thus, it cannot be maintained that “the formal charge in an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge against him; what is controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, and not the designation of the offense.”

5.    Court does not condone act; Act, however, remains to be less grave offense
The Court does not in any way condone Lucas’ act. Even in jest, he had no right to touch Linatok’s leg. However, under the circumstances, such act is not constitutive of grave misconduct, in the absence of proof that Lucas was maliciously motivated. It is also noted that Lucas has been in the service for 20 years and this is his first offense.

Suntay v. People [GR L-9430]
En Banc, Padilla (p) : 9 concurring

Facts: On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16 years, filed a verified complaint against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City, alleging that on or about June 21, 1954, the accused took Alicia from St. Paul’s College in Quezon City with lewd design and took her to somewhere near the UP compound in Diliman and was then able to have carnal knowledge of her.  On 15 December 1954, after an investigation, an Assistant City Attorney recommended to the City Attorney of Quezon City that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. On 23 December 1954 attorney for the complainant addressed a letter to the City Attorney of Quezon City wherein he took exception to the recommendation of the Assistant City Attorney referred to and urged that a complaint for seduction be filed against the petitioner. On 10 January 1955 the petitioner applied for and was granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs (No. 5981 [A39184]). On 20 January 1955 the petitioner left the Philippines for San Francisco, California, where he is at present enrolled in school.

On 31 January 1955 the offended girl subscribed and swore to a complaint charging the petitioner with seduction which was filed, in the CFI Quezon City, after preliminary investigation had been conducted (Crim. case Q-1596). On 9 February 1955 the private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an order “directing such government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having the accused brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law.” On 10 February 1955 the Court granted the motion.

On 7 March 1955 the Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the US instructing him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to the petitioner and to compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charges against him. However, this order was not implemented or carried out in view of the commencement of this proceedings in order that the issues raised may be judicially resolved. On 5 July 1955 petitioner’s counsel wrote to the Secretary requesting that the action taken by him be reconsidered, and filed in the criminal case a motion praying that the Court reconsider its order of 10 February 1955.  On 7 July 1955 the Secretary denied counsel’s request and on 15 July 1955 the Court denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence the petition.

The Supreme Court denied the petition, with costs against the petitioner.

1.    Due process not necessarily mean having a hearing
Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing may be dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply with the due process of law clause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the said clause.

2.    Court’s jurisdiction and procedure to be adopted
The petitioner is charged with seduction. And the order of the respondent Court directing the Department of Foreign Affairs “to take proper steps in order that the accused may be brought back to the Philippines, so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law,” is not beyond or in excess of its jurisdiction. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears most conformable to the spirit of said rules. (Section 6, Rule 124.)

3.    No “Quasi-Judicial Hearing” necessary if passport holder is facing criminal charges
Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion (Section 25, EO 1, S. 1946, 42 OG 1400) to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Suntay’s suddenly leaving the country in such a convenient time, can reasonably be interpreted to mean as a deliberate attempt on his part to flee from justice, and, therefore, he cannot now be heard to complain if the strong arm of the law should join together to bring him back to justice. In issuing the order in question, the Secretary was convinced that a miscarriage of justice would result by his inaction and as he issued it in the exercise of his sound discretion, he cannot be enjoined from carrying it out.

Masangcay vs. Comelec [GR L-13827.  28 September 1962.]
En Banc, Bautista-Angelo (J): 9 concur, 1 took no part.

Facts: On 24 October 1957, Benjamin Masangcay — then provincial treasurer of Aklan designated to take charge of the receipt and custody of the official ballots, election forms and supplies, as well as of their distribution, among the different municipalities of the province– with several others, was charged before the Comelec with contempt for having opened 3 boxes containing official and sample ballots for the municipalities of the province of Aklan, in violation of the instructions of said Commission embodied in its resolution promulgated on 2 September 1957, and its unnumbered resolution dated 5 March 1957, inasmuch as he opened said boxes not in the presence of the division superintendent of schools of Aklan, the provincial auditor, and the authorized representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and the Citizens’ Party, as required, which are punishable under Section 5 of the Revised Election Code and Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.

Masangcay et.al. complied with the summons issued by the Comelec to appear and show cause why they should not be punished for contempt on the basis of the charge. On 16 December 1957 the Commission rendered its decision finding Masangcay and his co-respondent Molo guilty as charged and sentencing each of them to suffer 3 months imprisonment and pay a fine of P500, with subsidiary imprisonment of 2 months in case of insolvency, to be served in the provincial jail of Aklan. The other respondents were exonerated for lack of evidence.

Masangcay brought the present petition for review raising as main issue the constitutionality of Section 5 of the Revised Election Code which grants the Comelec as well as its members the power to punish acts of contempt against said body under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court in that the portion of said section which grants to the Commission and members the power to punish for contempt is unconstitutional for it infringes the principle underlying the separation of powers that exists among the three departments of our constitutional form of government.

The Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from insofar as Masangcay is concerned, as well as the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, insofar as it concerns him; without pronouncement as to costs.

1.    Ruling in Guevara vs. Comelec reiterated; Duty of Comelec
In Guevara vs. Comelec, it was held that under the law and the constitution, the Comelec has not only the duty to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, but also the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with the elections. The Commission, although it cannot be classified as a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may however exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as controversies that by express provision of law come under its jurisdiction.

2.    Comelec lacks power to impose disciplinary penalty; Power to punish for contempt inherent in courts
The Comelec lacks power to impose the disciplinary penalty meted out to Macungcay in the decision subject of review. When the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the power to punish for contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the administration of justice. The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony. And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid.

3.    Resolution which Commission tries to enforce merely call for administrative or ministerial functions
The resolutions which the Commission tried to enforce and for whose violation the charge for contempt was filed against Masangcay merely call for the exercise of an administrative or ministerial function for they merely concern the procedure to be followed in the distribution of ballots and other election paraphernalia among the different municipalities. The Commission, thus, has exceeded its jurisdiction in punishing him for contempt, and so its decision is null and void.

4.    Constitutionality of Section 5 of Revised Election Code not passed upon
Due to conclusion arrived at, the Court deemed it unnecessary to pass on the question of constitutionality with regard to the portion of Section 5 of the Revised Election Code which confers upon the Comelec the power to punish for contempt for acts provided for in Rule 61 of our Rules of Court.

Ang Tibay v. CIR [GR 46496, 27 February 1940]
En Banc, Laurel (p): 6 concur.

Facts:

Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the CIR and to the motion for new trial of the National Labor Union.

The Supreme Court found it not necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-General, as it found no substantial evidence to indicate that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The Court granted the motion for a new trial and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth.

1.    The Court of Industrial Relations; Departure from rigid concept of separation of powers
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (CA 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasijudicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting, employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance for purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wageshares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment, between employers and employees or laborers and between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenants or farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be death with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section A, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all pertinent facts related to the industry concerned or to the industries established in a designated locality, with a view to determining the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum “canon” or rental to be paid by the “inquilinos” or tenants or lessees to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.

2.    The CIR free from rigidity of certain procedure requirements, but not free to ignore or disregard fundamental and essential requirements of due process involving proceedings of administrative character
The CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to “act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.” (Section 20, CA 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (Section 13) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due Process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.

3.    Cardinal primary rights respected in administrative proceedings; Guidelines
a.    Right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. The liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.
b.    The tribunal must consider the evidence presented, after t the party is given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts. The right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration.
c.    Wile the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. This principle emanates from the more fundamental principle that the genius of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
d.    Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
The statute provides that ‘the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.’ The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.
e.    The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, CA 103.) The CIR may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute of any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the CIR may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers (Section 10)
f.    The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally impossible for the titular heads of the CIR personally to decide all controversies coming before them. There is no statutory authority to authorize examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with right to appeal to board or commission, to solve the difficulty.
g.    The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

4.    New trial granted under circumstances
The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result.

Written as a reaction paper for Administrative Law, Public Officers, and Election Laws.

Endnotes

1. The author feels that the proposal by the Arroyo administration to allow Mr. Estrada to travel abroad as a form of a humanitarian initiative to the disgraced president and a gesture of reconciliation towards his ever-loyal followers may be the subject matter in a separate piece. [back]