Nestle Phils. Inc. v. NLRC, 195 SCRA 340 [1991]

Facts: Eugenia Nunez, Liza Villanueva, Emmanuel Villena, Rudolph Armas, Rodolfo Kua and Rodolfo Solidum were either employed as sales or medical representatives of Nestle Philippines. Said employees availed availed of the company’s car loan policy. Nunez, Villena, Villanueva and Armas were dismissed for having participated in an illegal strike. Kua and Solidum were dismissed for certain irregularities. Said employees filed complaints for illegal dismissal in the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter dismissed their complaints and upheld their dismissal. They appealed to the NRLC where their appeals are pending. Meanwhile, the company filed a civil suit to recover possession of the cars subject of the car loan policy, after the dismissed employees failed and refused to either settle the remaining balance of the cost of their respective cars, or to return them to the company for proper disposition. The dismissed employees sought a temporary restraining order in the NLRC to stop the company from cancelling their car loans and collecting their monthly amortication pending the final resolution of their appeals in the illegal dismissal case. The NLRC en banc granted the petition for injunction. The company filed a petition for certiorari, alleging that the NLRC does not have jurisdiction over the issue in the absence of any labor dispute related to the same. The petition was granted by the Supreme Court, annulling the NLRC resolution  in the petition for injunction.

Issue: Whether there is labor dispute arising or related to the issue involving the car loan policy so as to provide the NLRC jurisdiction over the petition for injunction.

Topic: Labor Dispute; Definition

Held: [N] “Labor dispute” includes any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. The power of the NLRC to issue writs of injunction, as found in Article 218 of the Labor Code, can only be exercised in a labor dispute. Nestlés demand for payment of the employees’ amortizations on their car loans, or, in the alternative, the return of the cars to the company, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves debtor-creditor relations, rather than employee-employer relations.  Although the illegal dismissal case is still pending resolution before the NLRC, the terms of the car loan agreements are not in issue in the labor case. The rights and obligations of the parties under those contracts may be enforced by a separate civil action in the regular courts, not in the NLRC.

San Miguel Corp. Employees Union v. Bersamira, 186 SCRA 496 [1990]

Facts: Contracts for merchandising service were entered into by San Miguel corp. (SMC) with independent contractors duly licensed by the DOLE namely Lipercon and D’Rite. The two contractors and SMC agreed that the workers employed by the contractors were to be paid by the contractors and that none of them were to be deemed employees or agents of SMC. However, SMC was advised by SMC Employees Union on November 20, 1988 that Lipercon and D’Rite workers signed up for union membership. It was the union’s argument that the said group of employees, while appearing to be contracted workers of independent contractors, they continuously worked for SMC for 6 months to 15 years and that their work was neither casual nor seasonal as they performed work or activities necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of SMC. The Union further argued that the “labor only” contracting situation and that the employment status of these workers shall be regularized. Upon petition for injunction and damage filed by SMC, the RTC issued an order enjoining the union from representing the Lipercon and D’Rite workers for the purpose of collective bargaining. The union sought to nullify the said writ on the ground that the controversy involved a labor dispute which was beyond the lower court’s jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not there exists a labor dispute between SMC and the union which makes the case under the jurisdiction of the labor tribunal.

Topic: Labor Dispute; Definition

Held:While it is San Miguel’s submission that no employer-employee relationship exists between itself, on one hand, and the contractual workers of Lipercon and D’Rite, on the other hand, a labor dispute can nevertheless exist “regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relationship of employer and employee (Article 212(i), Labor Code),” provided the controversy concerns, among others, the terms and conditions of employment or a “change” or arrangement” thereof. The existence of a labor dispute is not negated by the fact that the plaintiffs and the defendants do not stand in the proximate relationship of employee. A labor dispute, as defined by law, does exists herein, and is evident. What the union seeks is to regularize the status of the employees contracted by the Lipercon and D’Rite, was in effect that they be absorbed into the working unit of SMC. This matter definitely dwells on the working relationship between said employees vis-à-vis SMC. Terms, tenure and conditions of the employment and the arrangement of those terms are involved, bringing the matter within the purview of labor dispute.

Lopez Sugar Corp. v. Sec. of Labor, 247 SCRA 1 [1995]

Facts: The National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines-TUCP (NACUSIP-TUCP) filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE, Regional Office No. 6, Bacolod City) a petition for direct certification or for certification election to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the supervisory employees of Lopez Sugar Corporation (LSC) at its sugar central in Sagay, Negros Occidental. NACUSIP-TUCP averred that it was a legitimate national labor organization, that LSC was employing 55 supervisory employees, that majority of which were members of the union, that no other labor organization was claiming membership over the supervisory employees, that there was no existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) covering said employees, and that there was no legal impediment for the direct certification or to the holding of the certification election. LSC opposed claiming that such petition is bereft of factual basis, that it is intended to harass the company, and that the supervisory employees are not even aware of the petition. The Commercial and Agro-Industrial Labor Organization (CAILO), a registered labor organization also cliaming to count substantial membership among the LSC supervisory employees, moved to intervene. The motion was granted. Although the NACUSIP-TUCP and CAILO failed to appear in the hearings, the Med-Arbiter issued an order granting the petition inasmuch as it interpreted Article 257 of the Labor Code as mandatory. The order of Med-Arbiter was sustained by the Secretary of Labor. LSC filed a petition for certiorari, which was granted by the Supreme Court, annulling and setting aside the order of the Med-Arbiter and the decision of the Secretary.

Issue: Whether the federation’s bona fide status alone would suffice for a petition for certification to be granted.

Topic: Definitions; Labor Organization - Legitimate Labor Organization

Held: [N] NACUSIP-TUCP, a national labor organization duly registered with the DOLE, is a mere agent for the labor organizaztion (NACUSIP-TUCP Lopez Sugar Central Supervisory Chapter), the federation’s bona fide status alone would not suffice. The local chapter, as its principal, should also be a legitimate labor organization in good standing. Since the “procedure governing the reportining independently registered union” refers to the certification and attestation requirements contained in Article 235, paragraph 2 of the Labor Code, it follows that the Constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books of accounts submitted by the local chapter must likewise comply with these requirements. The same rationale for requiring the submission of duly subscribed documents upon union registration exists in the case of union affiliation. Herein, the only document extant on record to establish the legitimacy of the NACUSIP-TUCP Lopez Sugar Central Supervisory Chapter is a chapter certificate and nothing else.

Airline Pilots Assn., et al. v. CIR, 76 SCRA 274 [1977]

Facts: On 2 January 1971, Gomez, who claimed to be the President of the Air Line Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALPAP) filed a petition with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) praying for certification as sole and exclusive bargaining representative of “all pilots under employment of Philippine Airlines and are on active flights or operational assignments.” ALPAP led by Gaston, who also claimed to be its President, opposed said petition on the ground that the CIR had no jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof. However, prior to the filing of the said certification petitition, an ALPAP meeting was held on 30 October 1970 where 221 out of 270 members adapted a section which amended ALPAP’s constitution and by-laws, it provided that any member who shall be forced to retire or to resign or otherwise terminated for union activities may either continue his membership, or resign from the association. During this time, PAL and ALPAP where locked in a labor dispute as certified to the CIR. A return-to-work order was then issued by the CIR to all participants of the strike while PAL was ordered not to dismiss or terminate any employee. On 12 December 1970, despite of a no-work-stoppage order of the CIR, a majority of ALPAP members filed resignation / retirement letters. PAL accepted the said letters with the “caveat” that the pilots will not be entitled to any of the benefits / privileges since their acts constituted violation of the order of the CIR. Thereafter, Gaston was elected as President of ALPAP on the election held on 18-22 December 1970 by 181 votes. Meanwhile, 45 pilots who did not resign / retire from PAL elected Gomez as President on 23 December 1970. The CIR granted the certification petition filed by Gomez and thus, he was declared as President of ALPAP and entitled ALPAP to all the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization. Among the grounds cited by the CIR that justified said decision were (1) the PAL pilots belonging to the Gaston Group retired  / resigned en masse from PAL and accompanied this with actual acts of not reporting, (2) that the pilots associtated with the Gaston group tried to relieve their deposits from the ALPAP Credit Union on the ground that they had resigned /retired from PAL.

Issue: Whether Gomez is the duly elected President of the labor organization ALPAP, as declared by the CIR.
(BG’s issue: Whether membership in  the labor organization ALPAP is necessarily limited to employees of the particular employer PAL)

Topic: Definitions; Labor Organization - Legitimate Labor Organization

Held: The Supreme Court cannot subscribed to the restrictive interpretation made by the CIR of the term “labor organization” which is defined as “any union or association of employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment.” The absence of the condition which the court below would attach to the statutory conscept of a labor organization, as being limited to the employees of a particular employer, is quite evident from law. The emphasis of the Industrial Peace Act is clearly on the purpose for which a union or association of employees is established rather than that membership therein should be limited only to the employees of a particular employer. Trite to say, under section 2 (h) of RA 875, “representative” is defined as including “a legitimate labor organization or any officer or agent of such organization, whether or not employed by the employer or employee whom he represents.” Moreover, the election of Gomez as ALPAP President is not valid. He was elected at a meeting of only 45 members called just one day after Gaston’s election who received a majority of 180 votes out of 270 members. A labor union, however, may authorize a segment thereof to bargain collectively with the employer and in the exercise of such authority to have custody of the union’s funds, office and name. Having given Gomez the authority to enter and conclude bargaining contrafcts with PAL, it would be unreasonable to disallow Gomez a certain use of the office, funds and name of ALPAP when such use is necessary or would be required to enable ALPAP to exercise, in a proper manner, its delegated authority to bargain collectively with PAL.

Feati University v. Bautista, 18 SCRA 1191 [1966]

Facts: FEATI University Faculty Club held a strike against FEATI University upon the latter’s failure to comply with its demands. Since they were not able to settle, the case was brought to the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) which ordered the faculty members to return to work. FEATI filed a motion to dismiss maintaining that the CIR Did not have jurisdiction over the case because (1)  the Industrial Peace Act is not applicable to the University, it being an educational institution, nor to the members of the Faculty Club, they being independent contractors;  (2) the presidential certification is violative of Section 10 of the Industrial Peace Act, as the University is not an industrial establishment, and there was no industrial dispute which could be certified to the CIR; and (3) that since it is not an industrial establishment, hence, it is not an “employer” in contemplation of the Industrial Peace Act.

Issue: Whether FEATI University, an educational institution, is not an “employer” and the members of the Faculty Club, are not “employers” within the purview of the Industrial Peace Act.

Topic: Definitions; Employer and Employee

Held: [N] The Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction over unfair labor practice charges against educational institutions that are organized, operated and maintained for profit.  Industrial Peace Act is applicable to any organization or entity — whatever may its purpose when it was created — that is operated for profit or gain. Congress, in the Industrial Peace Act, did not intend to give a complete definition of “employer”, but rather that the definition in Section 2 (c) of the law to be complementary to what is commonly understood as employer.
Educational institutions, that are operated for profit, are included within the term “employer” as contemplated in the Industrial Peace Act, since they are not among the seceptions metioned in Section 2 (c) of the law. An employer is one who employs the services of others; one for whom employees work and who pays their wages or salaries. A University that engaged the services of the professors, provided them work, and paid them compensation or salary for their services, even if it  considers itself as a mere “lessee” of services under a contract between it and the members of said professors. For the purposes of the Industrial Peace Act the University is an industrial establishment because it is operated for profit and it employs persons who work to earn a living. The term “industry”, for the purposes of the application of our labor laws should be given a broad meaning so as to cover all enterprises which are operated for profit and which engage the services of persons who work to earn a living. Professors and instructors, who are under contract to teach particular courses and are paid for their services, are employees under the Industrial Peace Act. Striking professors and/or instructors of the University are employees because striking employees retain their status as employees. Professors and instructors are not independent contractors. The Court takes judicial notice that a university controls the work of the members of its faculty; that a university prescribes the courses or subjects that professors teach, and when and where to teach; that the professors’ work is characterized by regularity and continuity for a fixed duration; that professors are compensated for their services by wages and salaries, rather than by profits; that the professors and/or instructors cannot substitute others to do their work without the consent of the university; and that the professors can be laid off if their work is found not satisfactory. All these indicate that the university has control over their work; and professors are, therefore, employees and not independent contractors.

BF Goodrich Confidential and Salaried Employees Union vs. BF Goodrich Phils. Inc., 49 SCR 532 [1973]

Facts:  The BF Goodrich (Makati Office) Confidential and Salaried Employees-NATU sought recognition as the bargaining agent of such employees so that thereafter there could be negotiations for a collective contract. The BF Goodrich (Marikina Factory) Confidential and Salaired Employees-NATU sought the same. BF Goodrich filed two petitions for certification election with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR). Two strike notices by both unions with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), demanding union recognition. Days after the CIR commenced the hearings of the petitions for certification election, the union staged a strike for two days. Subsequently, after preliminary investigation, on the finding of a prima facie case of illegal strike and unfair labor practice committed by member of the two unions, the company filed a case for unfair labor practice against the unions. The company filed motions int he hearings for certification electin to hold such hearings in abeyance pending determination of the unfair labor practice case. The motions were denied by the CIR. The company filed a petition for certiorari, which the Supreme Court dismissed.

Issue: Whether the certification election may be held in abeyance pending the resolution of the unfair labor pracicee case, inasmuch as there is a possibility that some employees could lose employment status as a result of the latter case.

Topic: Labor Relations Policy: Statutory Source and Interpretation

Held: [N] An unfair labor practice caase should not be allowed to lend itself as a means to prevent a truly free expression of the will of the labor group as to the organization that will represent it. It is not only the loss of time involved but also the fear engendered in the mind of an ordinary employee that management has many weapons in its arsenal to bring the full force of its undeniable power against those of its employees dissatisfied with things as they are. There is no valid reason for the postponement sought. There is neither a contravention of what is expressly set forth in the Industrial Peace Act, which speaks of the labor organizations “designated or selected for the purpose of collective baragaining by the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit [be the exclusive] representative of all the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining.” The law clearly contemplates all the employees, not only some of them. As much as possible them, there is to be no unwarranted reduction in the number of those taking part in a certification election, even under the guise that in the meantime, which may take some time, some of those who are employees could possibly lose such status, by virtue of a pending unfair labor practice case.

PLDT vs. NLRC, 164 SCRA 671

Facts: Marilyn Abucay, a traffic operator of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), was  accused by two (2) complainants of javomg demanded and received from the the total amount of P3,800 in consideration of her promise to facilitate approval of their applications for telephone installation. Investigated and heard, she was found guilty as charged and accordingly separated from the service. She went tot he Ministry of Labor and Employment claiming she had been illegally removed. After the evidence and arguments of the parties were considered, the company was sustained and the complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter’s decision, however, awarded financial assistance to Abucay equivalent to one month of pay for every year of service. Both Abucay and PLDT appealed to the National Labor Relations Borad, which upheld the decision in toto. PLDT filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the petition, affirming the decision of the Board except for the grant of separtation pay in the form of financial assistance, which was disallowed.

Issue: Whether Abucay is entitled to financial assistance / separation pay even if she was removed from employment for just case, on the basis of equity and compassion and due to previous decisions of the Supreme Court.

Topic: Labor Relations Policy: Formulation and Historical Development; Labor Code

Held: [N] The rule embodied in the Labor Code is that a person dismissed for cause (as defined therein) is not entitled to separation pay. The case of Firestone Tire vs. Lariosa, Soco vs. Mercantile Corporation of Davao, Filipino Inc. vs. NLRC, and others, constitute the exception, based upon considertations of equity. Equity has been defined as justice outside law,  being ethical rather than jural and belonging to the sphere of morals than of law. Hence, it cannot prevail against the expressed provision of the labor laws allowing dismissal of employees for cause and without any provision for separation pay. Still, where the exception has been applied, the justification for the grant of separation pay and the amount or rate of such award. has not been consistent. The Court, thus, made distinctions. Where it comes to such valid but not iniquitous causes as failure to comply with work standards, the grant of separation pay to the dismissed employee may be both just and compassionate, particularly if he has worked for some time with the company. Under such circumstances, the award to the employee of separation pay would be sustainable under the social justice policy even if the separation is for cause. Separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. A contrary rule would have the effect of rewarding rather than punishing the erring employee for his offense. The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged.

National Service Corp. vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122

Facts: The National Service Corporation (NASECO) hired Eugenia Credo as a lady guard on 18 July 1975. Later, she was administratively charged by NASECO’s Manager of Finanace stemming from her non-compliance with the latter’s memorandum. When she was called to explain her side, she showed resentment in a scandalous manner and uttering remarks of disrespect in the presence of her co-employees. Thereafter, Credo was placed on forced leave status for 15 days and while on leave, NASECO’s Committee on Personnel Affairs recommended Credo’s termination. On 25 November 1983, due to her failure to explain her side on the charges, Credo was handed a notice of termination effective 1 December 1983. Credo then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal on 6 December 1983 with the Ministry of Labor and Employment. Credp contended that there was absence of just or authorized cause for the dismissal and there was a lack of opportunity to be heard.

Issue: Whether Credo was legally dismissed according to the Constitutional and Labor Code provisions on protection to labor.

Topic: Labor Relations Policy: Formulation and Historical Development; Labor Code

Held: [N] NASECO did not comply with the guidelines in effecting Credo’s dismissal. Credo was not given ample opportunity to be heard and to defend herself. Rule XIV, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code mandates that the employer must furnish an employee sought to be dismissed two (2) written notices of dismissal before a termination of employment can be legally effected. These are the notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought and the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. The said guidelines are in consonance with the express provisions of law on protection to labor   18 (which encompasses the right to security of tenure) and the broader dictates of procedural due process necessarily mandate that notice of the employer’s decision to dismiss an employee, with reasons therefor, can only be issued after the employer has afforded the employee concerned ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.

PAL vs. PALESA, 57 SCRA 489

Facts: Fidel Gotangco was apprehended at one of the gates of the Philippine Airlines (PAL) Airfield compound where a piece of lead material was confiscated from his person. Gotangco, being guilty of breach of trust and in violation of PAL’s rules and regulations, was dismissed. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), however, ordered Gotangco to be reinstated, without backwages; holding that dismissal is too severe a penalty to impose on Gotongco inasmuch as (1) it was Gotangco’s first time to commit the charge question of r the duration of his 17 years of service with PAL; (2) the cost of the lead material, considerting its size (8” x 10” x 1/2”), is negligible; (3) PAL did not lose anything after all as the lead material was retrieved in time; (4) the ignominy and mental torture undergone by Gotangco is pracically punishment in itself; and (5) that Gotangco has been under preventive suspension to date. PAL appealed by certiorari to the Supreme Court, relying mainly on the holding in Manila Trading & Supply Co. vs. Zulueta (30 January 1940). The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CIR.

Issue: Whether the Court of Industrial Relations has the right to order the readmission of a laborer who, it is admitted had been found derelict in the performance of his duties towards his employer.

Topic: Labor Relations Policy: Formulation and Historical Development; Labor Code

Held: [Y] The right of an employer, to freely select or discharge his employees, is subject tot the regulation by the State in the exercise of itss paramount police power. Although the employer cannot be compelled to continue the employment of a person who admittedly was guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance towards his employer; still, where the result would neither be oppressive nor self-destructive, it cannot be asserted dogmativcally that an outright termination of employer is justified. The doctrine in the Manila Trading & Supply Co. vs. Zulueta case did not call for automatic application. The Manila  Trading case should not lend itself as a justification for outright dismissal independently of the circumstances of each case. A host of decisions to the acceptance by this Court of the conclusion reached by the Court of Industrial Relations in the discharge of the task assigned to it to protect the rights of labor. Herein, a lead material of negligible size, not shown to be of any use to the company, hardly of any pecuniary worth, was picked up by Gotangco, but thereafter taken from him by a security guard. It would be too harsh an appraisal to view it as constituting theft.

Association de Agricultores vs.Talisay Silay Milling Co., 88 SCRA 294
Facts:  On 22 June 1952, Republic Act 809 was enacted for the purpose of addressing the necessity to increase the sahre of planters and laborers in the income derived from the sugar industry. Said act was to regulate the relations among the persons engaged in the sugar industry. Under Section 1 thereof, it was provided that “in the absence of written milling agreements between the majority of planters and the millers of sugarcane in any milling district in the Philippines, the unrefined sugar produced in that district from the milling by any sugar central of the sugar cane of any sugarcane planter or planter-owner, as well as all by-products and derivative thereof, shall be divided between them aas follows: 60% for the planter and 40% for the central in any district the maximum actual production of which is not more than 400,000 piculs..” The Association de Agricultores de Talisay-Silay Inc. and six sugarcane planters filed a petition to the Secretary of Labor, praying that the latter (1) declare the applicability to the Talisay-Silay Mill District of the sharing participation prescribed by RA 809 for every crop year statrting from 1952-1953; (2) adjudicated in favor of the planters and their laborers in the account entitled “In trust for Talisay-Silay Milling Co. Inc., and Department of Labor”; (3) order the Central to account for any unsold quedans or the proceeds thereof which have been deposited with the PNB in the trust account; (4) order the Central to account for and pay jointly and severally to the planters and their laborers the proceeds of the sugar representing the increased particiapation for the 1954-1955 crop year plus legal interest in facor of the planters computed on the basis of the average market price during the month within which the sugar was sold. On the other hand, the Talisay-Silay Milling Co. Inc. alleged that (1) RA 809 was invalid and unconstitutional; (2) that even if it was valid, the planters had written milling contracts witht the Central at the time the said act went into effect, and (3) the planters who entered into said contracts did so voluntarily and those voluntary contracts may not be altered or modified without infringing the constitutional guarantee on freedom of contracts and non-impairment clause of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether RA 809 would violate the non-impairment clause of the Constitution and infringe the Constitutional guarantee on freedom of contracts if applied to teh Talisay-Silay Mill District.

Topic: Labor Relations Policy: Formulation and Historical Development; Labor Code

Held: [N] RA 809 is a social justice and police power measure for the promotion of labor conditions in sugar plantations; hence, whatever rational degree of constraint it exerts on freedom of contract and existing contractual obligationas is constitutionally permissible. The said act was concerned and enacted as a social legislation designed primarily to ameliorate the condition of the laborers in the sugar plantation. Having in view its primary objective, to promote the interests of the labor, it can never be possible that the State would be bereft of constitutional authority to enact legislations of its kind. the imperious mandate of the social justice ideal consecrated in our fundamental laws, asserts its majesty, calling upon the courts to accord utmost consideration to the spirit animating the act assailed, not just for the sake of enforcing the explicit social justice provisions of the article on “Declaration of Principles and State Policies”, but more fundamentally, to serve the sacred cause of human dignity, which is actually what lies at the core of those constitutional precepts as it is also the decisive element always in the determination of any controversy between capital and labor. RA 809, which provides for bigger shares to the planters in the big milling districts than those in the small milling districts, does not violate the equal protection clause considering that the more a central produces, the bigger could be its margin of profit which can be correspondingly cut for the purpose of enlarging the share of the planters.